

Fragments from a Century: A History of Republican Turkey, 1923–2023

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29 October 2023 marks the centennial of the Republic of Turkey. The Republic, which emerged in 1923 as the successor of the defeated and partitioned Ottoman Empire after 600 years of existence across three continents, was the outcome of a process of nation-state formation that was triumphant for some and traumatic for others. As the longest-lasting secular republican regime in a region that is uniquely positioned between Europe and the Middle East, Turkey has remained the focus of international attention as a consequence of the hopes and fears it raises in the hearts and minds of contemporary observers.

In its hundred years of existence, Republican Turkey has undergone multiple political and social transformations. The post-Ottoman founding of Turkey under the auspices of the single-party regime of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) in the interwar years was shaped by authoritarian efforts at nation-building through cultural reforms and modernisation projects that radically constructed a new revolutionary ethos commonly known as Kemalism and from which arose a personality cult surrounding President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938). At the end of the Second World War, Turkey's political system changed from a dictatorship to a democracy over a period of five years. The tumultuous decades of the Cold War opened the way for a more democratic and culturally diverse field in state-society relations, but rapid socio-economic developments and ideological radicalisation resulted in political instability, which in turn legitimised Turkey's endemic military tutelage over civilian-democratic affairs. Post-Cold War Turkey suffered from corruption and intensified identity politics that fanned the flames of a debilitating violent conflict between the state and Kurdish insurgents. The brief moment of political opening as well as economic growth that was attained under the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) in the 2000s, a period of time when a number of laws that bolstered citizens' rights were passed, ultimately proved to be a false promise. The AKP regime's impressive expansion of state services and infrastructure in terms of scale and scope prioritised quantity over quality, ultimately changing the face of Turkey. Contemporary Turkey is now afflicted by multiple problems that have arisen as a result of the authoritarianism, populism, economic mismanagement, and misled and misleading foreign policies that have been brought into being during the two decades of AKP rule.

This volume, the first of its kind, offers an exploration of a hundred years of Republican history through a hundred "fragments" in which scholars who are experts in their fields

introduce and discuss historical sources related to a wide range of issues including politics, economics, society, culture, gender, and the arts. In doing so, this book not only delves into a truly multifaceted history of the country, but also allows readers to encounter the bygone voices and images of a past that is both captivating and critical for understanding Turkey's today and tomorrow.

A Fascination with Turkey: The Founding of the Republic

Proclaimed a century ago, the Republic of Turkey was the last of the new nation-states to appear on the map of Europe after the great continental empires had imploded in the aftermath of the First World War. At the same time, it was the first independent state to emerge from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and the only country whose borders were, for the most part, not drawn or dictated by the European powers of the day.¹

Even before the proclamation of the Republic on 29 October 1923, Turkey had acquired an exceptional reputation in both Europe and throughout the Muslim world. On the one hand, as a result of its victorious War of Independence (1919–1922), Turkey was the only country that had been defeated in the First World War to repudiate the vindictive terms of peace that had been imposed by the victorious Entente powers through the Treaty of Sèvres. Muslims, as well as the citizens of many oppressed nations in Asia and Africa, championed Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Turkish National Struggle as the spearhead of a global anticolonial struggle.² By way of the Treaty of Lausanne, the international community recognised Turkey's independence and national borders and defined its minority regime that recognised only non-Muslim communities as such, for the most part in line with the demands made by the Turkish delegates.³ On the other hand, when the Grand National Assembly of Turkey took the radical step of abolishing the monarchy—the six-hundred-year-old Ottoman sultanate—in

¹ For the period of chaos that erupted in the aftermath of the First World War, see Robert Gerwarth, *The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End 1917–1923* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016). Stanford J. Shaw's *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918–1923 – A Documentary Study*, 5 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000) provides a great deal of detail but largely reflects the views of the Turkish General Staff. For a new critical history of the Turkish War of Independence, see Ryan Gingeras, *Last Days of the Ottoman Empire, 1918–1922* (London: Allen Lane, 2022), and for an overview of the rise and fall of Muslim republics in the aftermath of the First World War, see Stefan Reichmuth, “Der Erste Weltkrieg und die muslimischen Republiken der Nachkriegszeit,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 40 (2014): 184–213.

² A global history of the Turkish War of Independence has yet to be written. For a transnational account of Turkish diplomacy during the War of Independence, see Carolin Liebisch-Gümüş and Alp Yenen, “Petitions, Propaganda, and Plots: Transnational Dynamics of Diplomacy During the Turkish War of Independence,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 25, no. 2 (2023): 185–206. For vignettes of mutual expressions of solidarity with the Turkish National Struggle across Asia and Africa, see Hadiye Yılmaz, *Kurtuluş Savaşımız ve Asya-Afrika'nın Uyanışı Hâkimiyeti Milliye Yazılarıyla* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007); Bilal N. Şimşir, *Doğunun Kahramanı Atatürk* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1999); and Orhan Koloğlu, *Gazi'nin Çağında İslam Dünyası* (İstanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık, 1994).

³ For a comprehensive history of the Treaty of Lausanne, see the numerous blog posts and podcasts created by a wide range of scholars on The Lausanne Project's website: <https://thelausanneproject.com/>

November of 1922, Turkey became the only republican regime in the Balkans and Middle East at the time. Since then, the republican form of government has remained in place, which may make it easy to overlook the revolutionary nature of the abolition of the monarchy in 1922 and the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey a year later, whereas a century ago, that transition was quite a sensation in world politics. Even more controversial was the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate in March 1924, five months after the proclamation of the Republic, which led to the disappointment of many of Mustafa Kemal's admirers across the Muslim world.⁴

It should come as no wonder then that the international public was intrigued by the entirely novel phenomenon of how a people, and a country, that had been perceived as "backward" and "Oriental" could successfully defend itself and then transform its system of governance into that of a "modern" republic. This international fascination with Turkey only increased when, in the following decade, the republican regime, utilising its flexible doctrine of Kemalism, made clear its intentions to Europeanise Turkey's institutions, legal system, and culture.⁵ As Turkey underwent a series of transformations in the 1920s and 1930s, it sparked interest among the numerous facets of European public opinion. For communists, as well as for leftists in general, it was the first nation to successfully resist Western imperialism and implement a planned economy.⁶ For liberals, particularly in France, the introduction of laicism held great appeal.⁷ As for the right, particularly in Germany, the spectacle of a "völkisch" and militarist nation-state led by a strong leader who pushed through revisions of the peace treaties that had been imposed upon his country was a source of inspiration.⁸

⁴ Cemil Aydın, *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 127–32.

⁵ For a thorough overview of the transnational appeal of Kemalism in the interwar years, see Nathalie Clayer, Fabio Giomi, and Emmanuel Szurek, "Transnationalising Kemalism: A Refractive Relationship," in *Kemalism: Transnational Politics in the Post-Ottoman World*, eds. Nathalie Clayer, Fabio Giomi and Emmanuel Szurek (London: I.B. Tauris, 2019), 1–37. For more on the transnational appeal and international affairs of Kemalist Turkey in the Middle East, see Amit Bein, *Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: International Relations in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). For a comparative history of Kemalism in relation to Italian Fascism and Russian Bolshevism, see Stefan Plaggenborg, *Ordnung und Gewalt: Kemalismus – Faschismus – Sozialismus* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012).

⁶ Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, "Turkish Transformation and the Soviet Union: Navigating Through the Soviet Historiography on Kemalism," *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 2 (2017): 281–96.

⁷ Remzi Çağatay Çakırlar, "Radikal Faktör: Tek Parti ve Kemalizm'in Oluşum Sürecinde Radikal Parti Etkileşimleri," in *Tek Parti Dönemini Yeniden Düşünmek: Devlet, Toplum ve Siyaset*, eds. Sevgi Adak and Alexandros Lamprou (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2022), 287–322; Pınar Dost-Niyego, *Le Bon Dictateur: L'image de Mustafa Kemal Atatürk en France (1923-1938)* (İstanbul: Libra Yayinevi, 2014).

⁸ Stefan Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014); Sabina Mangold-Will, *Begrenzte Freundschaft: Deutschland und die Türkei, 1918–1933* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013).

What Was New About the Republic? Continuity and Change after the Empire

The extent to which the “new Turkey” that emerged from the post-war chaos can truly be defined as a “new” state is, of course, open to debate. The fact that the new Turkey was now led by representatives who derived their legitimacy solely from reference to the “national will” and that power was exercised (de facto since 1920, de jure from 1923) through a revolutionary parliament established in the provincial capital of Angora/Ankara in the heart of Anatolia rather than wielded by the Sultan-Caliph in the great multicultural metropolis of Constantinople/İstanbul—a capital city for 1,600 years—was certainly a novelty. Ankara, the sizable Christian communities of which had largely perished during the war years, would be reconstructed to embody the new Turkish and Republican ethos of Turkey.⁹

Despite all of its radical breaks with the past, however, the new Turkey under the Kemalist single-party regime of the CHP was a continuation of the “Young Turk” Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, CUP) that had ruled over the Ottoman Empire as a single-party government from its seizure of power in a coup d'état in 1913 until its military defeat in 1918.¹⁰ The War of Independence was initiated as part of the CUP's wartime contingency plans for a post-war resistance movement of which Mustafa Kemal, a former CUP member, ultimately took over leadership, and soon afterwards he ousted CUP loyalists while co-opting other Unionist cadres.¹¹ As such, the armed struggle against the imposition of the Treaty of Sèvres was in fact won by the remnants of the regular Ottoman army under the command of Unionist officers who had acquired experience in the Balkan Wars and the First World War. The Republic of Turkey thus inherited far more from the Ottoman Empire than any of the other successor states that came into being in the Balkans and the Middle East,¹² as the new regime in Ankara maintained the central, provincial, and local bureaucracy

⁹ Alev Çınar, “State Building as an Urban Experience: The Making of Ankara,” in *Power and Architecture: The Construction of Capitals and the Politics of Space*, ed. Michael Minkenberg (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 227–60.

¹⁰ For more on the nature of the CUP's single-party regime, see Erik-Jan Zürcher, “Young Turk Governance in the Ottoman Empire During the First World War,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 55, no. 6 (2019): 897–913 and Erol Ülker, “İttihatçı Tek-Parti Rejimi Kurulurken Hizipler, Seçimler, Boykot,” *Mülkiye Dergisi* 45, no. 4 (2021): 940–62. For the single-party regime under Atatürk, see Ryan Gingeras, *Eternal Dawn: Turkey in the Age of Atatürk* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

¹¹ For more on the continuity and competition between the Unionists and Kemalists during the War of Independence, see Erik-Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Rôle of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905–1926* (Leiden: Brill, 1984); Emel Akal, *Milli Mücadelenin Başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal, İttihat Terakki ve Bolşevizm*, revised and extended edition (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012); and Alp Yenen, “Elusive Forces in Illusive Eyes: British Officialdom's Perception of the Anatolian Resistance Movement,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 54, no. 5 (2018): 788–810.

¹² For a preliminary overview that deserves an updated revisiting, see Ergun Özbudun, “The Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East,” in *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, ed. Carl L. Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 133–57. For Ottoman continuities in the Arab Middle East, including the role played by Ottoman-Arab military officers in post-war insurgencies and governments, see Michael Provence, *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

of the empire as well as its legislation and military.¹³ As a consequence, the new republic also inherited its political elite from the empire. While the Ottoman dynasty was exiled and expatriated, the leading cadres of the new regime consisted of former members of the CUP who would continue to govern all the way up until the 1960 coup d'état, when the third and last Unionist president of the Republic, seventy-seven-year-old Celal Bayar (1883–1986), was removed from office. Given that situation, the novelty of the regime was limited to its radical and republican reforms, but the process of nation-state formation nonetheless rested on the legacy of the Young Turks.¹⁴

The territorial contours of the “new Turkey” were also partly a consequence of the earlier policies of the “Young Turkey” of the 1910s. The new national borders were redrawn after a decade-long series of wars that lasted from 1912 to 1922.¹⁵ Even if the CUP regime had never relinquished its commitment to Ottoman imperialism and Muslim nationalism in favour of the creation of a Turkish nation-state in Anatolia, as is often wrongly assumed, many Unionists (and later-day Kemalists) were refugees from the Balkan provinces who had adopted the idea of Anatolia as the new national homeland of Turkish Muslims after the loss of the empire's European territories in 1913 and irreversibly so after parting with its Arab provinces in the armistice of 1918.¹⁶ Turkey's new territorial shape was not unfamiliar, as Western cartographers had long referred to the Ottoman provinces, especially those in Anatolia, as “Turkey in Asia,” as opposed to the Balkan provinces, which were called “Turkey in Europe”. But after the Treaty of Lausanne, in the minds of the Turkish leadership there was no room for Kurdistan and Armenia on the map of Anatolia. However, in contrast to the claims that have long been asserted in Turkish and Arab nationalist and European colonialist narratives, the separation of Turkey from its Arab provinces was not a forgone conclusion but a consequence of the post-war struggles in which France and Britain were able to suppress the uprisings of Arab and Kurdish insurgents in Syria and Iraq who stood in solidarity with the Turkish national forces in Anatolia as well as the Turkish nationalists' defeat of the (largely Armenian) French occupying forces in Cilicia.¹⁷ These new borders cut straight across landscapes through which

¹³ For a schematic survey, see Erik-Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Legacy of the Kemalist Republic,” in *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 136–50.

¹⁴ For an examination of various aspects of this issue, see the essays in Erik-Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

¹⁵ Alexander E. Balistreri, “Revisiting Milli: Borders and the Making of the Turkish Nation State,” in *Regimes of Mobility: Borders and State Formation in the Middle East, 1918–1946*, eds. Jordi Tejel and Ramazan H. Öztan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 29–58.

¹⁶ Erik-Jan Zürcher, “How Europeans Adopted Anatolia and Created Turkey,” *European Review* 13, no. 3 (2005): 379–94. For a critical intervention that examines the teleology of Turkey's nation-state formation in the general historiography, see Ramazan H. Öztan, “Point of No Return? Prospects of Empire After the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913),” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 50, no. 1 (2018): 65–84.

¹⁷ Hasan Kayalı, *Imperial Resilience: The Great War's End, Ottoman Longevity, and Incidental Nations* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2021); Alp Yenen, “Envisioning Turco-Arab Co-Existence Between Empire and Nationalism,” *Die Welt des Islams* 61, no. 1 (2021): 72–112; Ü. Gülsüm Polat, *Türk-Arap İtikileri: Eski Eyaletler*

people and goods had travelled unhindered for centuries and continued to do so until Ankara and its neighbours were able to enforce stricter border regimes.¹⁸

In socioeconomic and demographic terms, during its final decade the empire had also changed to the point of almost becoming unrecognisable. This was again primarily due to the demographic violence that erupted during the ten years of continuous warfare between 1912 and 1922. Because the Ottoman conscript army had recruited primarily from the peasant population of Anatolia, that populace had been decimated, not only through battlefield casualties, but also because of cholera and typhus epidemics.¹⁹ The problem of depopulation had been further exacerbated by the mass killings of Armenians in 1915–1916. The survivors of the genocide now largely lived in French Syria, Soviet Armenia, or farther abroad as part of a worldwide diaspora,²⁰ and their return to Turkey was rendered practically impossible. By the time of the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the majority of the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of western Anatolia and the Marmara region had either fled, been driven out, or been killed. The military reconquest of western Anatolia by the Turkish national forces had led to widespread atrocities on both sides and panic among the Greek Orthodox populace, many of whom sought sanctuary in Greece.²¹ The “population exchange” of 1923–1925, which in reality was a process of reciprocal deportations, led to the departure of Orthodox Greeks from central Anatolia and the Pontic region in exchange for some 400,000 Muslims from what was then northern Greece.²² The fact that the exchanged populations were identified as Greeks and Turks not because their mother tongues were Greek or Turkish but on the basis of whether they were Christian or Muslim underscored the cryptic logic of Muslim nationalism in the founding of the Turkish nation-state (as well as, of course, the dual nature of Hellenic-Orthodox

Yeni Komşulara Dönüşürken (1914–1923) (İstanbul: Kronik, 2019); Vahe Tachjian, *La France en Cilicie et en Haute-Mésopotamie: Aux confins de la Turquie, de la Syrie et de l'Irak (1919–1933)* (Paris: Karthala, 2004).

¹⁸ For an overview of the scholarship on the making of post-Ottoman borders, see Jordi Tejel and Ramazan H. Öztan, eds., *Regimes of Mobility: Borders and State Formation in the Middle East, 1918–1946* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021).

¹⁹ Erik-Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System, 1844–1914,” *International Review of Social History* 43, no. 3 (1998): 437–49; Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War: Between Voluntarism and Resistance* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Yiğit Akan, *When the War Came Home: The Ottomans' Great War and the Devastation of an Empire* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018).

²⁰ Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman M. Naimark, eds., *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

²¹ Emre Erol, *Ottoman Decline in Western Anatolia: Turkey's Belle Époque and the Transition to a Modern Nation State* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015); Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

²² Ashlı İğsız, *Humanism in Ruins: Entangled Legacies of the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018); Ellinor Morack, *The Dowry of the State? The Politics of Abandoned Property and the Population Exchange in Turkey, 1921–1945* (Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press, 2017); Emine Yeşim Bedlek, *Imagined Communities in Greece and Turkey: Trauma and the Population Exchanges under Atatürk* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016); Renee Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).

nationalism in Greece).²³ Because the Greeks had held a dominant position in the urban trade and service sectors, and the Armenians dominated the fields of artisanal crafts and services, the demographic change brought with it an enormous reduction in the skilled labour available to the new republic.²⁴ Early republican Anatolia (as well as eastern Thrace, the only remaining part of Turkey in Europe besides İstanbul) was thus very different from the same area in late Ottoman times; it was more rural and had fewer skilled labourers, in addition to being impoverished and emptied out. Many of its towns and villages were in ruins. Large parts of major towns and cities like Ankara, Manisa, and İzmir had been burnt down. The emptiness of the country was something that nearly all foreign visitors in the 1920s remarked upon, to such an extent that estimates of the population varied between a mere five to ten million. The results of the first republican census, which was carried out in 1927, showed that in fact Turkey had a population of approximately 13.5 million, which came as a positive surprise.²⁵

There are also less tangible, but nevertheless important, ideological elements of continuity between the empire and the republic that continue to be relevant down to the present day.²⁶ Michael Meeker aptly speaks of a “Nation of Empire”.²⁷ There is a strong culture of state nationalism and “*raison d’état*” as a transcendent value across the political spectrum,²⁸ as well as an implicit identification of the secular state as the guardian of Hanafi-Sunni Islam²⁹ and a strong emphasis on the militarist character of the Turkish culture of masculinity.³⁰ Last but not least, it could be said that there are twin—yet contradictory—historical imperial legacies. On the one hand, there is a general sense of pride in an imperial past in which the Ottomans were one of the benevolent superpowers of the day and ruled as a Turkish empire over three

²³ Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, “Mübadele: Müslüman Milliyetçiliğinin Tescili,” *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 349 (January 2023): 2–7; Erik-Jan Zürcher, “Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908–38,” in *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 213–35.

²⁴ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 11.

²⁵ William M. Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 18.

²⁶ For studies on Ottoman continuities in the ideological outlook of the Turkish Republic, see Erik-Jan Zürcher, “Ottoman Sources of Kemalist Thought,” in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 14–27; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic,” *Studia Islamica*, no. 86 (1997): 133–58; Selim Deringil, “The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namik Kemal to Mustafa Kemal,” *European History Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (1993): 165–91; Paul Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M. Landau (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 25–44.

²⁷ Michael E. Meeker, *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

²⁸ Tanıl Bora, “Nationalist Discourses in Turkey,” *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no. 2–3 (2003): 433–51.

²⁹ Ceren Lord, *Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

³⁰ Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

continents.³¹ On the other hand, there is a collective memory of traumatic foreign encroachment, internal rebellions, and territorial losses that ultimately put the continued existence of the state itself in jeopardy—a fate that, in the eyes of many Turkish nationalists even today, could potentially befall the state once again.³²

A comparison of the incarnation of the state that came into being a century ago with the Turkey of today immediately reveals that the country has undergone a series of dramatic transformations. The Turkey of 1923, comprised of 13 million people who were predominantly rural, illiterate, destitute, and afflicted by poor health, is quite different from the Turkey of today, which has a largely urban, literate population of 85 million and is now a middle-income country (even if there is a very high degree of inequality). Public works have turned Turkey into a country that is integrated to an extent that would have been unimaginable in 1923, not to mention fifty years ago. The combined effect of these transformations essentially makes the centenary of the Republic seem to come across as a success story. The citizens of Turkey today are incomparably wealthier and healthier than their forebears were in 1923, or even fifty years ago, and Turkey is also the most successful post-Ottoman state in the Middle East. It is logical, therefore, that the centenary of the republic would be commemorated and even celebrated. At the same time, however, the Turkish Republic was not only the beneficiary of the violent unmixing of the peoples of Anatolia as the Ottoman Empire collapsed, but it has unapologetically continued with the violent oppression of ethnic-religious minorities and political dissidents ever since.³³

Neither a Celebration nor a Condemnation: Thinking Critically about the Republic's Centenary

Turkey today is, in many ways, a vastly better country than it was in 1923, but it continues to have immense problems with its political system, implementation of the rule of law, human rights, and polarisation along ideological and cultural lines. So, how does this book fit into

³¹ Unlike clichés which claim that the Kemalist regime enforced a type of amnesia intended to erase its imperial past, recent studies demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire, with all its glory and gloom, was enthusiastically but selectively internalised by various political factions in the shaping of Republican Turkey's political ethos. Erdem Sönmez, "A Past to Be Forgotten? Writing Ottoman History in Early Republican Turkey," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 48, no. 4 (2021): 753–69; Halil Akkurt, *Türkiye Solunda Osmanlı Toplum Yapısı Tartışmaları: 1960–1980* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2020); Nicholas Danforth, "The Ottoman Empire from 1923 to Today: In Search of a Usable Past," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (2016): 5–27; Nicholas Danforth, "Multi-Purpose Empire: Ottoman History in Republican Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 50, no. 4 (2014): 655–78.

³² This is commonly referred to as Sèvres Syndrome or a Sèvres Complex. Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 163; Fatma Müge Göçek, "Why Is There Still a Sèvres Syndrome? An Analysis of Turkey's Uneasy Association with the West," in *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 98–184.

³³ For an insightful local history of the violence that plagued eastern Anatolia, see Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–50* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). The history of violence in Turkey is also surveyed in Stephan Astourian and Raymond Kévorkian, eds., *Collective and State Violence in Turkey: The Construction of a National Identity from Empire to Nation-State* (New York: Berghahn, 2020).

that picture? It is neither a celebration nor a condemnation of the Republic of Turkey in its centennial. While it seems to us that the centenary offers a superb opportunity to pause and reflect on the resilience of Republican Turkey, we are fully aware of the fact that the history of Turkey has had both bright and dark pages.

Looking back at Turkey's century-old history, we should resist the temptation to slip into "Turkish exceptionalism" in explaining Turkey's prospects and problems.³⁴ Many of the changes that Turkey has experienced were not unique to Turkey but rather were part and parcel of global trends, including post-imperial nation-state formation after 1918, the Great Depression of 1929–1939, and the global order of the Cold War after 1945, as well as the emergence of neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and postmodernist identity politics after 1989. At the same time, many of these changes have been expressed in Turkey in a very specific way. Any story of nation-building is also a story of exclusion, expulsion, assimilation, and suppression. But that, of course, is no excuse. It is not necessary to journey to the dark side of the moon, as Maurus Reinkowski noted, to discover that Turkey too had its fair share of violent episodes during the course of its nation-building process.³⁵ While Turkey's transition to a multi-party system was part of a second global wave of democratisation after the Second World War, which was celebrated by modernist Orientalists like Bernard Lewis as an exception in the Muslim world, Turkey's democratic trajectory left much to be desired given the realities of pervasive military tutelage and human rights abuses.³⁶ Like elsewhere across the world, industrialisation, mass migration, large-scale tourism, globalisation, and the building of a welfare state followed by its demise under neoliberalism have shaped Turkish society and the economy. All of these developments created opportunities for a few at the expense of large-scale human suffering and enabled the social mobility of different groups at different times but without necessarily creating a more pluralist society.

Turkey entered 2023 in the grips of a severe humanitarian, financial, and political crisis, governed, as it has been, for the previous two decades by a democratically elected but increasingly populist-authoritarian regime that has openly rejected some of the foundational principles of the Republic. All the same, hundreds of events and projects are being planned, among them a number of commemorative publications devoted to the centennial of the Republic of Turkey. When compared to the celebrations that took place on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Republic in 1973 and the hundredth anniversary of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's birthday in 1981, it immediately becomes apparent how much has changed. In both 1973 and 1981, Turkey was under the sway of the repressive repercussions of the military interventions that took place in 1971 and 1980, respectively. All the publications that were linked to those celebrations bore the mark of the official state discourse (and also literally

³⁴ Lerna K. Yanık, "The Making of Turkish Exceptionalism: The West, the Rest and Unreconciled Issues from the Past," *Turkish Studies* (online-first 2022): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2022.2159816>

³⁵ Maurus Reinkowski, *Geschichte der Türkei: Von Atatürk bis zur Gegenwart* (München: C.H. Beck, 2021), 162.

³⁶ Bernard Lewis, "Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy," *Middle East Quarterly* (March 1994): 41–49. For a critique of Turkey's democratisation in the post-Cold War era, see Kerem Öktem, *Turkey Since 1989: Angry Nation* (London: Zed Books, 2011).

in the sense that they shared a single logo).³⁷ While Turkey is going through dark days once again and has suffered as a result of an attempted coup d'état in 2016 and subsequent political purges and repression, the imposition of such a uniform vision of commemoration would be impossible today. In spite of repeated attempts by the AKP regime to violently suppress dissident voices and unabashedly promote its Islamist-populist outlook, a vibrant civil society continues to exist and publicly challenge state doctrine in its various forms. The state is no longer an ideological hegemon in Turkey, even if it still is a political behemoth.

So how can we celebrate the centennial of the Republic of Turkey while also honouring those who have been marginalised and mistreated throughout its history? How can we laud Turkey's democratic political institutions without pardoning their undemocratic record? How can we appreciate Turkey's development and progress while at the same time decrying the despair and disparities it has simultaneously created? Although we are not interested in offering up a middle ground for the purposes of establishing a rapport between these contradictions, we argue that these critical questions should be part of the commemoration of the centenary of the Republic of Turkey in 2023 without necessarily discrediting it altogether either.

What We Offer: A Fragmented Illustration of Historical Complexity

This book is certainly not another history of “modern Turkey”. There are several textbooks that cover that subject for university students and interested readers, including Erik-Jan Zürcher's now thirty-year-old *Turkey: A Modern History*, the fourth revised edition of which came out in 2017.³⁸ As an edited volume, the current book is also unlike other academic handbooks that

³⁷ Some exceptions include the highly recommendable collection of articles in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, eds., *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State* (London: Hurst, 1981) and Jacob M. Landau, ed., *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Boulder: Westview, 1984).

³⁸ Histories of “modern” Turkey are generally defined by their coverage of both (late) Ottoman and Republican history in a single volume. The most detailed political history in English is still Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 1993, 4th ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), which also offers many critical perspectives on the official historiography. Although considerably outdated, Bernard Lewis' *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 1961, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) remains a classic that every serious student of modern Turkey should read, especially for its (rather Western-centric) treatment of the history of culture and ideas. While rich in detail, Carter Vaughn Findley's *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernity: A History 1789–2007* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), Sina Akşin's *Turkey, from Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to the Present*, trans. Dexter H. Mursaloğlu (New York: New York University Press, 2007), and Feroz Ahmad's *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993) adopt secular-modernist narratives that are close to Kemalist historiography. In French, Hamit Bozarslan's *Histoire de la Turquie: de l'empire à nos jours* (Paris: Tallandier, 2013) and in German, Reinkowski's *Geschichte der Türkei* (2021) are a good alternative for critical approaches. Then there is the odd format that covers the history of the Turks from premodern Turkestan to modern Turkey, the most notable examples of which are Klaus Kreiser and Christoph K. Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2003) and Carter Vaughn Findley, *The Turks in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

offer state-of-the-art surveys on certain key themes concerning Turkey.³⁹ Our aim was not to craft a cohesive narrative or a complete survey, but rather to embrace the unconnected and incomplete nature of vignettes of historical records.

What we have tried to do in this book can perhaps best be described as a fragmented illustration of historical complexity. We call the short chapters of our book “fragments” because each of them offers a glimpse into the workings of a partial historical reality that is part of a larger whole that could not have been illustrated in its entirety and diversity by any other means. Together with a group of colleagues, we collected one hundred such fragments that deal with political, social, cultural, and economic moments that have, in one way or another, been significant in the shaping of Turkey as we know it today.

It should be noted, however, that while our book offers up one hundred historical fragments, beginning in 1923 and ending in 2023, not every year is represented by a fragment of its own. The method we used to structure the fragments consisted of dividing those hundred years into ten decades. For each decade, we collected ten fragments that we thought represent developments that are significant for particular moments in history. In building a thematic collection of a hundred fragments covering ten decades, we consciously tried to strike a balance between the familiar and the fringe, combining major events with curious instances. Of course, we realise that this decade-based structure is, to a certain extent, an artificial device and that the fragments included here can neither represent all the major trends and transformations of a particular decade nor fully capture the scope of large processes that took place over periods of time lasting longer than ten years. Consequently, it is impossible for such a collection to claim to be complete. Nevertheless, we are confident that readers will grasp the “spirit” of each decade through our selection and be able to trace the developmental traits of certain issues across several fragments over the course of multiple decades.

By way of a uniform format, each fragment in our book introduces and then discusses a fragmentary piece of a historical artifact, such as a law, speech, essay, letter, newspaper article, poem, song, memoir, photograph, poster, map, diagram, and so on. These historical

³⁹ For comprehensive collected volumes on modern Turkey that still offer excellent thematic surveys despite being slightly outdated in some chapters, see Reşat Kasaba, ed., *The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume 4: Turkey in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philip Robins, eds., *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). In recent years, Routledge Publishing House published a number of handbooks about Turkey that may not offer much in the way of detailed content coverage due to their short chapter format but still provide a very useful service by concisely surveying the state of research in various fields and on a variety of themes. Metin Hepar and Sabri Sayari, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 2012); Alpaslan Özerdem and Matthew Whiting, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics* (London: Routledge, 2019); Joost Jongerden, ed., *The Routledge Handbook on Contemporary Turkey* (London: Routledge, 2021); Didem Havlioğlu and Zeynep Uysal, eds., *The Routledge Handbook on Turkish Literature* (London: Routledge, 2023). Similarly useful is Güneş Murat Tezcür, ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Turkish Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022). Although not as complete as could be in these times of online encyclopaedias, students of modern Turkish history may also benefit from the concise information provided in Metin Hepar, Duygu Öztürk-Tunçel, and Nur Bilge Criss, eds., *Historical Dictionary of Turkey*, 4th ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

excerpts, objects, and snapshots will enable our readers to encounter a wide variety of voices and images from Republican Turkey's past. We have tried to ensure that our selection of historical fragments is balanced by including a combination of central, top-down, and elite perspectives with peripheral, bottom-up, and subaltern viewpoints. Moreover, our contributors have striven to embed the historical fragments in their due contexts in order to illustrate the political and social developments that shaped their cultural production. Thanks to their format, each fragment constitutes a stand-alone entry, so readers do not have to read the hundred fragments chronologically from cover to cover. Each fragment yields surprising insights into as well as original takes on Republican Turkey's history, sociology, and culture. Ideally, these fragments will not only impart knowledge about the various topics and decades they cover, but also give readers a "feel" for Turkey's complex realities.

Due to the very nature of these small fragments of primary sources, at a glance our book may resemble those documentary sourcebooks that are commonly used in university courses to give students the opportunity to read and analyse primary sources in translation.⁴⁰ To date, no such sourcebook has been published in English that is solely devoted to the history of the Republic of Turkey.⁴¹ As such, our book fills that gap, as it was designed for use in university courses, and lecturers are invited to share these historical fragments with their students so they can hold discussions about various aspects of Turkey's politics, society, culture, and economy on the basis of primary sources. However, the concept of our book also goes beyond being a sourcebook that merely offers an unannotated collection of historical records, as our fragments combine the presentation of historical sources with expert commentary. So, in addition to allowing the sources to speak for themselves, we have given our contributors ample space to introduce, describe, interpret, and explain the meaning and relevance of these fragmented historical sources. In that way, we hope that our book will also find a place in the

⁴⁰ There are numerous sourcebooks that cover the history of the Middle East, including Turkey, such as Camron Michael Amin, Benjamin Fortna, and Elizabeth Brown Frierson, eds., *The Modern Middle East: A Sourcebook for History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Julia Clancy-Smith and Charles Smith, eds., *The Modern Middle East and North Africa: A History in Documents* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); John Felton, ed., *The Contemporary Middle East: A Documentary History* (Washington DC: QC Press, 2008); Marvin E. Gettleman and Stuart Schaar, eds., *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader* (New York: Grove, 2003); J.C. Hurewitz, ed., *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, 2nd revised and enlarged ed., 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979); Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, revised and enlarged edition (New York: Praeger, 1982); Akram Fouad Khater, ed., *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East* (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2010).

⁴¹ Credit must be given to Hülya Adak, Erika Glassen, and Sabine Adatepe, eds., *Hundert Jahre Türkei: Zeitzeugen Erzählen* (Zürich: Unionsverlag, 2010), which is an anthology of excerpts from literature and memoirs from the late Ottoman Empire to the twenty-first century. For sourcebooks and readers that cover specific aspects of Turkey's history and sociology, see Şirin Tekeli, *Women in Modern Turkish Society: A Reader* (London: Zed Books, 1995) and Esra Özyürek, Gaye Özpınar, and Emrah Altunış, eds., *Authoritarianism and Resistance in Turkey: Conversations on Democratic and Social Challenges* (Cham: Springer, 2019). There are, of course, anthologies of literary works, such as Talat S. Halman and Jayne L. Warner, eds., *An Anthology of Modern Turkish Drama*, 2 vols. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008) and Kemal Silay, ed., *An Anthology of Turkish Literature* (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1996), just to name a few.

private libraries of avid readers who want to learn more about Turkey's history on their own through the guiding narrative of scholars of Turkish Studies.

A Collective Effort in Times of Crisis: Turkish Studies at a Critical Juncture

In order to realise this ambitious project, we involved a large circle of specialists working on Turkey—not all of them historians by any means, but they all have a strong historical interest in the country. The authors are from a variety of countries (though there is a large Turkish contingent), have backgrounds in various disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, and are from different generations. What this means is that the collection not only offers a survey of a wide range of aspects of Turkey's development in the last hundred years, but also an overview—or perhaps it would be better to say a snapshot—of the landscape of Turkish Studies today, which is a very lively and diverse field.

Turkish Studies, as an academic discipline, has dual roots. On the one hand, in what used to be called Turcology at European universities, which essentially was a branch of Oriental Studies, the work of scholars was devoted to the history and philology of Turkic peoples from antiquity to the present.⁴² On the other hand, in Area Studies, a field that developed primarily in the United States from the Cold War onwards, scholars of Turkish Studies began to focus more on the implicitly policy-relevant aspects of historical and social-scientific research on Turkey.⁴³ In the last four decades or so, these two traditions have increasingly merged and Turkish Studies has developed into an interdisciplinary field that brings together international scholars of history, cultural studies, and the social sciences who study modern Turkey utilising a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches as well as transnational and comparative perspectives which have reduced the isolation of the field to a great extent.⁴⁴

⁴² Emmanuel Szurek, "Épistémologie de la turcologie," *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 24 (2017): <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.5524>; Hans Theunissen, "Turks in Nederland," in *Nederland in Turkije – Turkije in Nederland*, ed. Jan Schmidt (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2012), 92–117; Christoph Herzog, "Notes on the Development of Turkish and Oriental Studies in the German Speaking Lands," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 8, no. 15 (2010): 7–76.

⁴³ Nathan J. Citino, "The Ottoman Legacy in Cold War Modernization," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40, no. 4 (2008): 579–97; Cangül Örnek, "From Analysis to Policy: Turkish Studies in the 1950s and the Diplomacy of Ideas," *Middle Eastern Studies* 48, no. 6 (2012): 941–59; İlker Aytürk, "The Flagship Institution of Cold War Turcology," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. 24 (2017): <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.5517>. For a comparative study of the politics of Cold War Turkey, see Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018). For the history of Area Studies in the US during the Cold War, see Zachary Lockman, *Field Notes: The Making of Middle East Studies in the United States* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020); Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 100–48.

⁴⁴ On the advancement of Turkish Studies, see Marie Bossaert and Emmanuel Szurek, eds., "Transturcologiques: Une histoire transnationale des études turques / Transturcology: A Transnational History of Turkish Studies," special issue of *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 24 (2017), <https://journals.openedition.org/ejts/5370>; Erik-Jan Zürcher, "Monologue to Conversation: Comparative Approaches in Turkish Historiography," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 15, no. 4 (2014): 589–99; Howard Eissenstat, "Children of Özal: The New Face of Turkish Studies," *Journal of*

As part of a diverse epistemic community, the contributors to our book mostly utilise critical approaches in Turkish Studies, as we commonly question and deconstruct the official, national, and popular narratives related to Turkey. For that reason, our book also allows for glimpses into the current research trends and paradigmatic transformations of critical approaches in Turkish Studies.

Currently, Turkish Studies is going through a critical juncture of its own making. Pioneering works of critical scholarship emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as a reaction to the brutal military intervention of 1980 and the Kemalist discourse of military tutelage.⁴⁵ Quite a few of the scholars who took a critical approach lost their jobs at universities under the military junta, which led directly to the (re-)formation of alternative publication venues such as the publishing house İletişim (1983), the Tarih Vakfı (1991), which is a historical association, and critical journals such as *Tarih ve Toplum* (1984–2003, 2005–2014, 2021–) and *Birikim* (1975–1980, 1989–). Retrospectively referred to as “post-Kemalist” scholarship, such critical studies have brilliantly deconstructed some of the foundational myths in the field and bravely pointed out some of the “original sins” of the Republic of Turkey that continue to plague Turkish politics. In the face of the growing challenges posed by Islamist and Kurdish identity politics, Kemalism did indeed go through a crisis after the 1990s.⁴⁶ Kemalism had developed into a threefold cult of Western modernity, Turkish sovereignty, and Atatürk’s personality. In the 2000s, a more activist-based version of this post-Kemalist critique became more and more mainstream in Turkey’s public discourses—as well as in international Turkish Studies. Scholars and opinion-leaders increasingly upheld the idea that the cure for Turkey’s problems resulting from its Kemalist establishment could only arise from a takeover by the antagonising forces of liberal Islamism.⁴⁷ Hence, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, major

the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 1, nos. 1–2 (2014): 23–35; Sinan Ciddi and Paul T. Levin, eds., “Turkish Studies from an Interdisciplinary Perspective,” special issue of *Turkish Studies* 15, no. 4 (2014); Robert Zens, “Turkish Historiography in the United States,” *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 8, no. 15 (2010): 149–77; Donald Quataert and Sabri Sayarı, eds., *Turkish Studies in the United States* (Bloomington: Indiana University Ottoman and Modern Turkish Studies Publications, 2003).

⁴⁵ For the establishment of a new academic consensus in Turkish Studies in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, see Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988) and Irvin Cemil Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

⁴⁶ Key features of the crisis of Kemalism are summarised in Şerif Mardin, “Some Notes on Normative Conflict in Turkey,” in *The Limits of Social Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation in Particularist Societies*, ed. Peter Berger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 207–31. For the identity crisis of Kemalism, see also Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); Hans-Lukas Kieser, ed., *Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Ayşe Kadioğlu and E. Fuat Keyman, eds., *Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011).

⁴⁷ Most prominently critiqued in İlker Aytürk, “Post-Post-Kemalism: In Search for a New Paradigm,” trans. Kevin Cole, *European Journal of Turkish Studies* (forthcoming), originally published as İlker Aytürk, “Post-Post-Kemalizm: Yeni Bir Paradigmayı Beklerken,” *Birikim*, no. 319 (November 2015): 34–48. For his responses to his critics, see İlker Aytürk, “Bir Defa Daha Post-Post-Kemalizm: Eleştiriler, Cevaplar, Düşünceler,” *Birikim*, nos. 374–375

international publications in the 2000s celebrated the AKP and its particular brand of “moderate Islamism” as the harbinger of the democratisation, liberalisation, and pluralisation of Turkey. The hype was real, since the promises were backed up by deeds. The AKP government energetically curbed the regressive influence of the old Kemalist-secular establishment in the military, bureaucracy, industry, and media. The end of the military tutelage of the political system in Turkey was realised through the passing of a huge number of laws (261 within the first year) that strengthened the roles of elected officials and of civil society. However, the subtle but growing authoritarianism of the AKP regime became undeniable as late as the Gezi Protests of 2013.⁴⁸ This unmasking of the uglier sides of the regime rendered a great number of more recent works by Turkey experts suddenly obsolete as they had not only failed to foresee these authoritarian developments but also uncritically reproduced the AKP’s own myths and vigorously denied any wrongdoing on the behalf of the AKP despite evidence to the contrary.⁴⁹ The complete unmaking of Turkey’s political institutions in the last decade, including a transition to an all-powerful presidential system, and the utterly incomprehensible scale of human rights abuses and shameless corruption scandals garnered the attention and energy of most Turkey experts.⁵⁰ While the changes that Turkey has undergone in recent decades might perhaps inspire a need for new syntheses and new interpretations of Republican history, the risk remains that Turkish historiography is once again being written retrospectively on the basis of contemporary political contentions.

By publishing this collected volume of one hundred fragments, we highlight some of the new approaches that emerged after this critical juncture. First, while remaining firmly critical, we offer new and more nuanced interpretations of the Kemalist single-party regime and its repressive policies.⁵¹ Second, unlike the mainstream post-Kemalist scholarship of the 2000s, we offer new critical studies of the Islamist and right-wing movements that arose in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Third, acknowledging that critical studies on identity

(June–July, 2020): 101–19. See also the multidisciplinary contributions in İlker Aytürk and Berk Esen, eds., *Post-Post-Kemalism: Türkiye Çalışmalarında Yeni Arayışlar* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2022). How the Turkish liberal-left and their global partners embellished the rise of Islamism is discussed in Cangül Örnek and Funda Hülagü, “Idiocy or Ideological Fallacy?: An Attempt to Interpret the Fatal Amour Between the Left Liberal Intelligentsia and the Islamists in Turkey,” (2018), https://www.academia.edu/42911424/Idiocy_or_ideological_fallacy_An_Attempt_to_Interpret_the_Fatal_Amour_Between_the_Left_Liberal_Intelligentsia_and_the_Islamists_in_Turkey

⁴⁸ For an early warning that went beyond voicing neo-Kemalist discontent, see Yunus Sözen, “Turkey Between Tutelary Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism,” *Private View*, no. 13 (2008): 78–84. https://www.academia.edu/43163465/Turkey_between_tutelary_democracy_and_electoral_authoritarianism

⁴⁹ Claire Berlinski. “Guilty Men: How Democracies Die,” *The American Interest*, 24 April 2017, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/04/24/guilty-men/>. For a confession and explanation of such fallacies in the political sciences, see Paul Kubicek, “Faulty Assumptions About Democratization in Turkey,” *Middle East Critique* 29, no. 3 (2020): 245–57.

⁵⁰ For a recent overview of these issues, see Yeşim Arat and Şevket Pamuk, *Turkey Between Democracy and Authoritarianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

⁵¹ For a collection of state-of-the-art research on the Kemalist single-party regime with which we share many contributors, see Sevgi Adak and Alexandros Lamprou, eds., *Tek Parti Dönemini Yeniden Düşünmek: Devlet, Toplum ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2022).

and minority politics have made some of the most crucial contributions to Turkish Studies in recent decades, we prominently featured such approaches in our volume too, most notably regarding the Kurdish conflict and women's rights. The unconventional structure of the book also made it possible for us to overcome some of the weaknesses of the current state of research in Turkish Studies. For one thing, our decision to start off the chronology with the year 1923 went decidedly against the grain of most historical surveys of modern Turkey that—for good reason—devote much attention to the late-Ottoman origins of the Republic of Turkey. Since we have acknowledged these continuities from empire to republic in this introduction, the remainder of the book will offer a reading of the decades of Republican history in their more momentary temporality. Moreover, by giving each decade equal weight and space, we have countered some of the imbalances and bridged some of the gaps in the current state of research in Turkish Studies. Our book thus avoids the typical overemphasis on the early decades of the Republic marked by the Kemalist single-party state, which feature prominently in the works of both Kemalist and post-Kemalist historians as the “singular” formative period in Republican history. The decade-based structure forced us to give understudied periods, especially that of the Cold War, due attention. Furthermore, our book avoids slipping into the presentism and historical myopia that is common among social scientists working in Turkish Studies who tend to magnify the contemporary political struggles that have occurred in the last two decades of the AKP's rule as the ultimate trajectory of history. Instead, our fragments demonstrate the existence of numerous alternative routes and moments that subdue teleological expectations.⁵²

Last but not least, the mobilisation of such a broad array of expert knowledge would not have been possible without the enthusiastic cooperation of our colleagues, which, we are happy to say, was offered in abundance. We would like to thank our colleagues and PhD candidates in the Turkish Studies programme at Leiden University's Institute for Area Studies (LIAS), in alphabetical order: Onur Ada, Petra de Bruijn, Remzi Çağatay Çakırlar, Uğur Derin, Bilgen Erdem, Ömer Koçyiğit, Gözde Kircioğlu, Nicholas Kontovas, Nicole van Os, Deniz Tat, Hans Theunissen, and Didem Yerli, for their input in the design of the style and format of the book's fragments.⁵³ In addition, we are immensely grateful to the international circle of friends and colleagues associated with Leiden's Turkish Studies programme for making this book possible with their imaginative ideas and contributions. Many of the contributors also volunteered to peer-review the contributions to guarantee the quality of the content, for which we are

⁵² For more on such alternative approaches, see Erik-Jan Zürcher, “Turning Points and Missed Opportunities in the Modern History of Turkey: Where Could Things Have Gone Differently?” in *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 285–95.

⁵³ The idea for this book was inspired by the format of the online teaching materials prepared as a retirement gift for Erik-Jan Zürcher from the chair of the Turkish Studies in August 2018. <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/humanities/institute-for-area-studies/turkish-studies/courses>

greatly thankful. We would also like to thank Didem Yerli and Uğur Derin, who provided invaluable assistance in launching the project and keeping up with correspondences and editorial procedures, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, and Mark David Wyers, who is himself a historian as well as a professional editor and translator, for providing a final review and copy-editing the manuscript. This book project benefitted from the Leiden Faculty of Humanity's Faculty Impact Fund and also from a LIAS publication grant, for which we are grateful, as we are to Saskia Gieling and her colleagues at Leiden University Press for their enthusiasm in including such a large project among their offerings.

It was the German Romantics of the Jena Circle at the turn of the nineteenth century who popularised the format of the fragment as a short stylistic genre of writing in philology and philosophy. "What are these fragments? What is it that gives them such great value? To which power of spirit do they particularly belong?" asked Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) in a treatise he wrote in 1804 about the work of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781). "If we do not look to each fragment cowardly [*sic*], but the mass and the spirit of the whole, we may boldly say: the spirit that rules them is wit."⁵⁴ We trust our readers' "wit" as the formative principle of these one hundred fragments in understanding the historical complexity of Republican Turkey as it has unfolded in the last hundred years. While acknowledging that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, we have also trusted in the "wit" of our colleagues in the organic shaping of the composition and variety of the fragments presented here, which we hope will give a sense of the spirit of the whole in understanding Turkey's history in its centenary.

⁵⁴ Quoted from the English translation in Tanehisa Otabe, "Friedrich Schlegel and the Idea of Fragment: A Contribution to Romantic Aesthetics," *Aesthetics*, no. 13 (2009): 64. See also Andreas Käuser, "Theorie und Fragment: Zur Theorie, Geschichte und Poetik kleiner Prosaformate," in *Kulturen des Kleinen: Mikroformate in Literatur, Kunst und Medien*, eds. Claudia Öhlschläger, Sabiene Autsch, and Leonie Süwolto (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 41–55.